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Computer-mediated communication (CMC) provides many benefits, 
including quick, efficient communication over time and space. At the same 
time, however, the anonymity it offers can give a sense of impunity, an 
illusion that behaviour is less hurtful than it really is, and a suppression of 
empathy. In short, CMC can be a fertile ground for conflict, and one 
particular manifestation of this is trolling. Trolling involves deliberately 
attacking others online, typically for amusement’s sake. In some cases, it 
can be taken to such an extreme that it clearly violates UK legislation on 
hate-speech, abuse and menace. Whilst forensic linguistic research into 
threatening and abusive language is, however, gradually growing (Carney, 
2014; Chakraborti, 2010: 99–123; and Fraser, 1998), there is a shortage of 
research into linguistic aggression online, and particularly research into 
trolling (see, however, Binns, 2011; Herring et al., 2002; and Shin, 2008). 
In endeavouring to contribute to this under-researched area, this paper 
seeks to address the question, ‘How do users respond to (perceived) 
trolling?’ The answer to this is elaborated through the creation of a working 
taxonomy of response types, drawn from 3,727 examples of user 
discussions and accusations of trolling which were extracted from an 
eighty-six million word Usenet corpus. I conclude this paper by discussing 
the limitations and applications of this research. 
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1. Introduction: under the bridge 
 
Extensive research into threat, risk and conflict can be found in many fields 
beyond linguistics, including politics, business, sociology, law, psychology 
and peace studies. Within linguistics, however, research into what we might 
loosely call forensic pragmatics, such as speech acts of threatening, the use 
of impoliteness, the issuing of insults, and so forth, is far less established 
(see, however, Carney, 2014; Chakraborti, 2010: 99–123; and Fraser, 
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1998). To complicate matters further, much of this research focusses on 
either speech, taken in some cases from contrived scenarios such as reality 
television shows, or from ‘traditional’ writing such as blackmail notes, 
threatening letters and newspapers. Linguistic research into computer-
mediated communication (CMC) is only just beginning to gather 
momentum, and the combination of these factors presents a challenge. The 
intersection of linguistic research that examines both forensic pragmatic 
behaviours such as impoliteness, linguistic aggression, or threat on the one 
hand, and CMC on the other, is remarkably small. Smaller still is the subset 
of CMC research that looks at the specific type of online aggressive 
behaviour known as trolling (see, however, Binns, 2011; Herring et al., 
2002; and Shin, 2008). 
Trolling is generally used to describe online antagonism 
undertaken for amusement’s sake (Hardaker, 2013: 77) – though, 
particularly within media and social networking circles, it is possible to 
find widely divergent denotations and usages that make the creation of any 
clear definition almost impossible. Current semantic complexities aside, 
trolling is a term with a history that can be traced back at least to the 1980s 
(e.g., Doyle, 1989; Maddox, 1989; and Mauney, 1982).2 Despite the 
longevity of this behaviour’s existence – at least relative to the usual 
lifespans enjoyed within social networking – trolling has really only 
reached mainstream consciousness in recent years (see, for example, BBC, 
2010; Camber and Neville, 2011; and Morris, 2011). And, as mentioned 
above, it has received little academic attention thus far, especially in fields 
like linguistics (see, however, Binns, 2011; Donath, 1999; Golder and 
Donath, 2004; Herring et al., 2002; and Shachaf and Hara, 2010). 
This great shortage of research has made it necessary to provide the 
groundwork to this field beginning with questions that are elementary, such 
as, “What is trolling?” and “How is trolling carried out?” Previous research 
(see Hardaker, 2010, 2013) demonstrated that current work on impoliteness 
largely fails to account for trolling, it set about establishing a working 
definition of this behaviour, and then outlined a range of major strategies 
said to be employed by trolls, including digression, (hypo)criticism, 
antipathy, endangerment, shock and aggression. This paper now takes 
another small step forward by considering how users respond to (perceived) 
trolling. To do so, it presents the findings of an analysis of 3,727 user 
discussions of trolling, drawn from an eighty-six million word Usenet 
corpus. 
There are several points to note here, however, before moving on. 
For reasons that are given below, I focus purely on the perception of 
trolling, and I try to reiterate this throughout by using such terms as 
‘(perceived) strategies’ and ‘(alleged) troller’. Where perceived, alleged, 
and so forth are omitted due to constraints of grammar or clarity, their 
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inclusion should be assumed. Furthermore, speaker and hearer throughout 
should, unless stated otherwise, be taken to mean any producer of 
communication (e.g., one who speaks, writes and gestures) and any 
consumer of that communication (e.g., one who hears, reads and watches). 
This is an imperfect gloss since this data is literally written, but given that it 
also incorporates a wide range of speech-like elements, there is no ideal set 
of titles to use here. Moreover, given the frequency of speaker and hearer 
throughout, I have abbreviated them to S and H, respectively. And, finally, 
within much of the data, S’s and H’s sex are unknown or uncertain, leading 
to another complication. The use of the singular they is both awkward, and 
in some cases, confusing. Therefore, for purely alliterative convenience, S 
is deictically indexed as she/her/hers, whilst H is indexed as he/him/his 
(e.g., ‘S may find that, though she can prove H wrong, he rejects her 
explanation in favour of his own’). In the few instances where the examples 




1.1 The Gyges effect 
 
CMC involves communication between humans that is mediated through a 
device such as a smartphone, computer or games console (Herring, 2003: 
612). Many aspects of CMC are worthy of attention – anonymity, 
disinhibition, dehumanisation, the reduced ability to interpret intentions, 
and so forth – but due to the limitations of space, few can be considered. 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect is anonymity, since it underpins many anti-
social online behaviours. 
The worldwide web presents many examples of sites that can be 
shown on a cline from those that allow fully anonymous accounts, through 
to those that prohibit ‘fake’ identities and require full disclosure of offline 
identities (Bernstein et al., 2011; Facebook, 2010; and Lampe and Resnick, 
2004). The notion of a ‘real’ identity is problematic for reasons too 
numerous to tackle here; however, the practical reality is that users will 
typically circumvent or ignore software, administrators and terms of use, 
and choose their own level of online identity disclosure. 
More relevant for this paper is the Gyges effect or, in other words, 
the ways that anonymity can affect behaviour. This has been of interest to 
academics across many fields, including psychology, sociology and 
philosophy, back to the time of Plato and his story of the shepherd, Gyges. 
This shepherd, upon finding a ring that makes him invisible (i.e., 
unidentifiable and, therefore, anonymous), used the protection that the 
invisibility afforded him to infiltrate the royal household, seduce the queen, 
assassinate the king and take the kingdom. Plato then argues that this power 
presents such a corruptive force that even the most morally upstanding 
could not resist it (Plato, 2007: 2.360b). 
CMC can be viewed as a modern ring of Gyges which, through the 
invisibility or anonymity it offers, encourages a loss of self-awareness, a 
sense of impunity, an increased likelihood of acting upon normally 
inhibited impulses, increased polarisation, and decreased consideration and 
empathy for others online (Sia et al., 2002; and Siegel et al., 1986) – or, in 
short, a sense that users can carry out, and then hide from the consequences 
of anti-social and criminal online behaviour. This toxic disinhibition 
(Vinagre, 2008: 321), according to Douglas and McGarty (2001: 399), can 
manifest itself in behaviours such as trolling and flaming.3 
A final, though by no means minor issue, is the way in which we 
deal with deceptive linguistic practices like trolling, since issues such as 
intention and interpretation become pressing considerations. Since these 
were discussed at length in Hardaker (2010) and again in Hardaker (2013), 
due to considerations of wordcount, they are only summarised here. In 
brief, following several researchers (e.g., Arundale, 2008; Gibbs, 2001; and 
Haugh, 2008), I take the view that we do not ‘know’ or ‘retrieve’ 
interpretations or intentions. Instead, it is my view that H must hypothesise 
from the available evidence, sometimes very quickly, what S actually 
intended (Culpeper et al., 2003: 1552; and Mills, 2003: 136). This means 
that, as interactants, we are continually, recursively hypothesising about: 
 
(1) The intentions of others; 
(2)  Their interpretations of our intentions; 
(3)  Their hypotheses about our interpretations of their intentions; 
and so on. 
(Mills, 2003: 45; and Mooney, 2004: 900) 
 
Under normal circumstances, these hypotheses may well be unconscious, 
and only consciously called into question when we experience interactional 
problems. Furthermore, these hypotheses may be based on available 
contextual and cognitive information such as logic, schema, inferencing, 
and shared historical, cultural and social knowledge. However, because this 
process is still all largely educated guesswork, S or H can be (or can appear 
to be) incorrect for a number of reasons, including mistakes, ambiguity, 
deception, and so forth (Grimshaw, 1990: 281). This grey area, however, is 
precisely the opening that allows trolling to exist. Since we do not ‘know’ 
another’s intentions, an indeterminate area is available for the troller to 
exploit – an ‘unknown zone’ in which they can imply sincerity, whilst 
intending mischief; and since it is impossible ever to ‘prove’ what was 
really intended, there is always room for doubt and disbelief from H, and 
for deception, insincerity and manipulation from S. 
A further result of this ‘unknown zone’ is that we – as analyst or 
user or bystander – cannot ‘know’ a troller’s guilt, and that means, 
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furthermore, that there is simply no method in existence by which we can 
retrieve ‘every example of trolling’, for instance. First, a strange irony of 
trolling research is that the most skilled, covert types of trollers will never 
be identified as such. They will always successfully evade or defend 
themselves against accusations of trolling, and will, therefore, appear to be 
just like any other sincere member of a CMC group. Secondly, as discussed 
above, to claim to ‘know’ that someone is trolling is to claim to ‘know’ 
their intentions, and yet this is not possible. We can guess at, hypothesise, 
reconstruct, and co-construct, and so on, but we cannot ‘know’. And, 
thirdly, this would ignore the fact that the identity of trolling is often co-
constructed, sometimes through heated arguments spanning many days, 
involving dozens of users, and situated within a set of fluctuating, 
community-based norms. As a result, extracting instances of trolling from 




2. Data and method: troll hunting 
 
The data in question comprises two corpora derived from Usenet (described 
below) with a combined word-count of 86,412,727 words.4 Usenet predates 
the current incarnation of the worldwide web, and is: 
 
[…] an electronic forum for discussion of almost any subject, 
allowing access to millions of computer users who share similar (or 
very different) hobbies, interests and worldviews (McLaughlin, 
Osborne, and Smith, 1995). Characterised by its immediacy and sheer 
volume of traffic, Usenet groups based around the discussion of a 
particular topic afford a prime example of Internet communities. The 
main method of communication is text-based e-mail, although some 
groups permit the exchange of graphics, sound or video files. 
(Baker, 2001: 1) 
 
Datasets from Usenet have several benefits: (i) newsgroups exist on an 
extraordinary range of topics; (ii) some have archives spanning back to the 
1980s; and (iii) posts can be downloaded. The result is that building a 
principled corpus with regards to topic, chronology, language, region, and 
so forth is relatively easy. A further aspect is that trolling is said to have 
begun on Usenet (Tepper, 1997) and, indeed, we can find examples of this 
term’s usage in archives up to three decades ago (e.g., Maddox, 1989; 
Mauney, 1982; and Miller, 1990). However, as with any other type of data, 
this type of data has its limitations, too. Usenet is arguably a dying platform 
– a fate perhaps accelerated by the rise of Web 2.0 social networks. As a 
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result of this, the average user demographic may tend towards older long-
term members, with the result that behaviours found on Usenet may be 
different from those found on Twitter, Facebook, etc. This is nearly 
impossible to rigorously test, however; and, overall, for the purposes of this 
exploratory article, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. 
The first corpus, RE, was built from a subset of the rec.equestrian 
newsgroup. RE’s theme is equestrianism, competitions, breeding and 
related topics such as welfare, agriculture and nutrition. The second corpus, 
SF, was created from a subset of the uk.sport.football newsgroup. SF’s 
theme is (English) football, fixtures, leagues and related topics such as 
wages, management and refereeing. Both groups are unmoderated, and 
allow users to employ high levels of anonymity. Further details of each 
corpus are found in Table 1. 
 
==Insert Table 1 about here== 
 
Once RE and SF were created, I used WordSmith (Scott, 2009) to retrieve 
all instances of TROLL*.5 Searching the corpora with an open-ended 
wildcard resulted in around ~9 percent false hits (e.g., Trollope); but using 
this wildcard also retrieved derivations, inflections, compounds, 
neologisms, and some typographical errors that might otherwise have been 
excluded. RE returned 2,643 instances, whilst SF returned 1,456 instances. 
This created an initial sub-corpus of 4,099 examples that was reduced to 
3,727 once the false hits were excluded. Though WordSmith retrieved an 
impressive set of results from RE/SF, no search can currently retrieve off-
record or implicit references to TROLL (e.g., ‘it has a sub-bridge 
apartment’). These instances were only captured if TROLL occurred in a 
more explicit part of the thread. The examples discussed in this paper 
should not, therefore, be taken as an exhaustive collection of all instances 
of trolling in RE/SF. 
A cautionary note, as already mentioned above, is that we cannot 
know someone’s trolling guilt or innocence; so, should a genuine troller 
successfully encourage many users to respond without anyone ever 
realising what she is about, then such an example will not have been 
captured by this search. This is because the search looked purely for 
TROLL* and if this string or any of its variants did not occur in the thread, 
then the thread was not retrieved. 
This brings to the fore an issue in combining corpus linguistic 
methods with pragmatic analyses. As a field, pragmatics concerns itself 
with the constructions and understandings of meanings within social 
interaction, including implied and inferred meanings, intentional and 
unintentional meanings, the dynamic and the emergent, or, in short, with 
phenomena that may leave little or no trace on the text whatsoever 
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 The asterisk (*) wildcard denotes ‘zero or more characters’, so a search for CAT* retrieves 
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(Culpeper and Hardaker, forthcoming). Given that corpus linguistics relies 
heavily on stable linguistic features that can be consistently found and 
readily counted, it would be easy to assume that using corpus methods to 
carry out pragmatic analyses is simply not viable. However, in reality, the 
field of ‘corpus pragmatics’ is gathering momentum, as evidenced by the 
publication of major volumes and overview papers (e.g., Jucker, 2013; 
Jucker et al., 2009, Romero-Trillo, 2008; and Taavitsainen et al., 2014). 
In the case of this study, because it is not possible to retrieve 
pragmatic phenomena such as trolling by searching for fixed linguistic 
forms, it was necessary to start more simply, by investigating the 
metapragmatic label of trolling first and working outward to analyses of 
(alleged) trolling, thereafter. This meant that the computer’s role in the 
analysis largely ended after retrieving the varying linguistic forms (troll, 
trolls, trolled, etc.), since, at this stage, the aim was then to identify the 
circumstances that had led to a version of the meta-pragmatic label 
occurring, and then, for the purposes of this paper, to identify from those 
examples, the major types of response to (alleged) instances of trolling. In 
short, in this case, a corpus approach was useful in rigorously deriving from 
the full corpus a smaller dataset of examples that were then amenable to 
manual, qualitative analysis; but the extent of corpus methods within this 
forensic pragmatic analysis should not be overstated. (This issue is 
discussed further in Section 2.2.) 
 
 
2.1 Classifying responses 
 
Following Watts (2003: 9), the analysis of first-order understandings and 
co-constructions of interaction is viewed as the only valid means of 
developing a social theory – not just of politeness, but also of impoliteness, 
trolling, and so forth. This is because first-order approaches foreground the 
interactant’s interpretations, whilst trying to background the analyst’s. This 
approach is not problem-free, however. Lay users often lack the meta-
linguistic repertoire required to apply a rigorous framework to their 
interaction (O’Keefe, 1989). Despite this, interactants can and do regularly 
assess behaviours such as trolling on a moment-by-moment basis, and 
individuals often also arrive at interpretations that are consistent with 
others. This suggests, therefore, the existence of an implicit, principled 
system of assessing the contextual appropriacy of behaviour. 
In-keeping with this first-order approach, at first, the subsequent 
classifications of responses were informed by whether they fell within the 
scope of the four strategies suggested by Harris et al. (1986), later 
developed by Culpeper et al. (2003: 1562–5), and then modified to account 
for trolling. These were: 
 
(1)  Does not respond to the trolling; 
(2)  Accepts the trolling; 
(3)  Counters the trolling defensively (i.e., by protecting H’s own face); 
or, 
(4)  Counters the trolling offensively (i.e., by attacking S’s face). 
 
As the analysis progressed, however, it quickly became apparent that these 
categories were largely unsuitable. For instance, it is virtually impossible to 
determine whether someone has chosen not to respond, and why that might 
be. It is also difficult to apply a concept like ‘accept the trolling’ to this 
data. Meanwhile, both offensive and defensive countering did occur, but 
there were still many other types of response that were left unaccounted for. 
As a result, this initial framework was altered and expanded to account for 
other response types. As far as possible, those categories were driven by the 
user’s interpretations and discussions of their own responses surrounding 
the mention of trolling, (though inevitably, this was not always possible, 
since users do not always meta-label their own behaviour). 
When categorising, it is possible to create potentially thousands of 
contextually specific, fine-grained sub-categories (e.g., responding 
sincerely with anger, responding sincerely with disinterest). However, the 
interest here was in identifying more general behaviours (e.g., responding 
sincerely), and this resulted in seven response types ranging from the fully 
naïve (i.e., apparently unaware of the trolling) through to the fully cynical 
(i.e., apparently fully aware of the trolling): engaging, ignoring, exposing, 
challenging, critiquing, mocking and reciprocating. 
 
 
2.2 Counting responses 
 
When we come to the issue of counting pragmatic strategies in any corpus, 
it is vital to emphasise two points. Firstly, given how creative users and 
groups can be, this list (and one might argue, any list of pragmatic 
strategies) cannot ever be truly called exhaustive. In addition, the data does 
not represent all of Usenet, nor even all equestrian or football groups on 
Usenet. Data from different sources, times and cultures will almost 
certainly reveal strategies that are not captured here. As such, these findings 
should be considered cautiously – as representative of these two groups 
over the timespan in question, and perhaps more importantly, as offering 
hypotheses to test against CMC groups. It would be interesting to see, for 
instance, if trolling is responded to in the same way in groups that are 
moderated, that encourage full identity disclosure or that only support 
short-form messaging. 
Secondly, in keeping with the first-order approach, I strive to 
emphasise what the user emphasises. The issue here, however, is that 
different users may cite different response types for the same individual, or 
one user may cite multiple possible response types (e.g., that they are both 
exposing the troller and challenging her at the same time). And, of course, 
users do not always include that useful meta-discussion of the response 
type they feel they are giving, thereby leaving the analyst in the position of 
ascribing one. Whilst this was not problematic in the majority of cases, it is 
always possible for misinterpretation to creep in. This returns us to the 
fundamental problem stated above: our inability to know, for certain, what 
another individual intends. 
A third issue is that since all the examples were retrieved by 
searching for instances of TROLL*, and since, of these, nearly all involve Hs 
discussing their perspectives on trolling, any statistical analysis of the data 
would be biased towards features that Hs interpret as trolling, rather than 
those that definitely are instances of trolling. 
The combination of these factors – (i) the potential co-occurrence 
of several types of response; (ii) the frequent absence of meta-discussion 
from H about which response type they feel they are using; and (iii) our 
general inability to know intention – has made statistical, quantitative 
analyses so highly qualified as to have little value in this study. This section 
presents, therefore, a qualitative overview of the major response types that 
could be identified when the data was analysed. In this case, ‘major 
response types’ is used to mean response types that: (i) occur consistently 
(e.g., three times or more in at least one dataset); (ii) always include at least 
one user voicing their suspicion that the post being responded to is a troll; 




2.3 Changes to the data 
 
In line with previous papers (2010, 2013), as far as possible, I have avoided 
altering the data, and all spelling, grammar and (non-indenting) punctuation 
are original. However, some changes were necessary. These are as follows: 
 
(1) To enhance anonymity, all names are replaced with letters. In each 
example, user-letters re-start at A (though see point 7, below). 
This means that, unless stated otherwise, A in Example 1 is not the 
same person as A in Example 2. 
(2) Italics in square brackets indicate information that has been 
removed or glosses, (e.g., [web address]). 
(3) Indenting punctuation (e.g., >) has been removed, since 
subsequent replies already present chronological threads for the 
reader to follow. 
(4) For brevity and clarity, unnecessary line-breaks were removed. 
(5) Italics highlight the parts of an example that are being analysed. 
(6) Whilst Usenet now offers rich text, very few posts use this, so all 
are presented in standard text. 
(7) Where applicable, the (alleged) troller is designated A 
(underlined). Where none appears, A is avoided. 
(8) Most examples are excerpts from threads that are, in many cases, 
significantly longer. Inevitably, this leads to orphaned deictic 
markers, users being addressed but not appearing, missing 
contextual information, and so forth. To mitigate this, examples 
that stand reasonably well alone are used, and/or the relevant 
context is summarised. 
(9) Sections deleted from long posts are indicated using […]. 
 
 
3. Analysis: user responses 
 
This section considers how users respond to (alleged) trollers. It also 
addresses how well the replies fall within the scope of the response 
strategies suggested by Harris et al. (1986), developed by Culpeper et al. 
(2003: 1562–5), and modified here to account for trolling. As noted above, 
these involve: (i) not responding, (ii) accepting, (iii) countering 





The first response-type involved one or more users sincerely engaging with 
a troller, and, for the corpus software to have retrieved the thread in the first 
place, at least one other user explicitly communicating her suspicions that 
the post being responded to is a troll. Sincere engagement involved 
responses to the (alleged) troller’s ‘pseudo-intent’ – that is, the deceitful, 
faux-sincere impression, given by the troller, of wishing to be a genuine 
group member – that suggested that those pseudo-intention(s) were 
genuine, and that any ‘real’ (i.e., trolling) intentions had not been detected. 
As in Example 1, sincere H-responses can include aggravated retaliation 
(i.e., flaming), interest, dismay and shock. These types of responses are not 
easily captured by the strategies outlined above by Culpeper et al. (2003: 
1562–5), particularly if S’s trolling strategy was off-record: 
 
Example 1  
A I spotted an old usable horse trailer, while taking my wife on an 
anniversary trip yesterday. So I drove out, and [Name Surname], 
the seller, pulled a tractor and backhoe out from in front of the 
trailer I wanted, so I could try a short tow, with my anemic S10 
truck. 
B You’re going to try to pull a loaded horse trailer with an S10? 
I think you’re going to be minus an S10 in a hurry. 
C He’s a troll. You bit. 
(RE060830) 
 
In this case, B engages with A’s apparently genuine intent by critiquing his 
choice of vehicle for pulling a horsebox, and, in so doing, constructs 
himself as someone providing a sincere answer to another user’s sincere 
question. C, however, not only assesses A’s behaviour as trolling, but also 
explicitly identifies that B has taken the bait, reframing B’s response as a 
waste of time. 
As seen in Example 1, sincere engagement with a troll is 
sometimes termed biting, being trolled, being hooked, etc. (note the 
derivations from fishing), and as with most instances where a person finds 
out that she has been taken in, there can be an associated loss of face or 
damage to pride. Experienced users endeavour to avoid being cast as one 
who has taken the bait due to the implications this has of naïveté, ignorance 
and gullibility, and they also strive to position themselves as 
knowledgeable members with the foresight to avoid, predict and deal with 
trolling. The greater the member’s status, the greater the loss of face is if 
that member is then trolled: 
 
Example 1 
A Who is to say this fabled other recipient of Best’s new liver would 
have treated it any better? What if it went to someone who had 
lived a decent, healthy lifestyle that had suddenly been struck 
down by liver disease because he had offered a smoker a lift to the 
fish factory one morning? What, then, if Mr Fabled Recipient then 
thought to himself, ‘Fuck me, Nigel (for that is his name)! I have 
just wasted 42 years of my life being a stupid goody two shoes 
and yet I still nearly died of liver disease. Fuck this for a lark, I’m 
going on the biggest bender of all time.’ And then our Nigel is 
found dead from snowball OD six months later. How can you say 
that wouldn’t have happened? You know, George Best wasn’t the 
only cunt on the planet capable of fucking up a new liver. 
B How the fuck does offering (or even giving, for that matter) 
somebody a lift, to a fish factory, give nigel liver disease? 
C The question we all wanted to ask, but didn’t want to feel 
trolled. I love you, I do. 
(SF060117) 
 
Whilst B’s response to the (alleged) troller, A, seems rather wry and 
sarcastic, it is C’s response that most clearly encapsulates the tension 
between responding to someone out of curiosity, interest or irritation, and 
not wanting to expose oneself to the ignominy of being trolled. As Donath 
(1999: 6) states, ‘trolling is a game about identity deception, albeit one that 
is played without the consent of most players’. 
Sincerely engaging with a troller is akin to participating in a large, 
public game where one player is cheating, but, moreover, where other, 
honest players are aware of this. Whilst some honest players may try to 
educate the dupes, others may enjoy simply sitting back and mocking the 
naïveté of those who have been fooled. This can, therefore, make being 
trolled a publicly embarrassing affair, and, as with impoliteness, the size of 






A strategy that occurred extensively in RE, but never (properly) in SF, was 
to ignore trolling through blocking, killfiling (i.e., blocking) or simply not 
reading the troller’s posts. Where users do this silently (that is to say, 
without alerting others), there is, of course, no trace in the data, and this is 
most consistent with the ‘do not respond’ option suggested in Culpeper et 
al. (2003: 1562). However, this leaves nothing to analyse, nor even any 
evidence of its occurrence, so it is not discussed any further. 
Instead, the focus is on the strategy of ‘overtly’ ignoring the troller, 
akin to Culpeper et al.’s (2003: 1562) defensive strategy of ‘opting out on 
record’. Users commonly (purport to) act in the group’s interest by alerting 
others to their suspicions, and suggesting methods of dealing with the 
problem. This strategy is predicated on the idea that trollers are seeking 
attention, and if sufficiently starved of it, they will eventually get bored and 
leave. Users, particularly in RE, frequently tried to curb responses from 
others by not only highlighting the suspect’s status as a troller, but also by 
advising, asking or telling other members what to do: 
 
Example 3 









D All I asked was "where have you been!?". I wasn’t encouraging 
anything. 




All three examples demonstrate the notion that killfiling or ignoring the 
troller in some way denies her what she wants. As such, B, C and 
especially E construct their identities as experienced members who not only 
know how to deal with trollers, but are willing to take steps to protect their 
group from disruption. Doing so positions trolling as an inappropriate, 
undesirable behaviour that is socially marked in RE, and that needs to be 
stopped quickly to maintain group harmony. As mentioned above, 




B Ok, ok, ok, folks, let’s not feed the troll and maybe he’ll go 
away. I’ve already warned him privately that censure will be taken 
if he continues to spam. There’s only one newsgroup here for 
which this post is on-topic. 
C Oh well that’s sure to scare him off! 
B lol It did, well, nearly. 
(SF050417) 
 
This is the only SF example containing a user commenting on a discussion 
about ignoring trollers. On further investigation, whilst C is a member of 
SF, B is a member of another group that has also received the (alleged) 
troller’s post. When replying, B has then (probably accidentally) cross-
posted back to all the groups that were caught up in the initial offending 
post, including SF. SF member C is more concerned with mocking B’s 
attempts at solving the problem than supporting C’s strategy of ignoring the 
troller. C, therefore, does not cast trolling as problematic or marked – 
rather, he constructs B’s efforts as laughably futile. 
Whilst RE users took frequent steps, sometimes heatedly, to 
prevent one another from responding to trollers, SF produced no examples 
of this type. In fact, the general trend, as seen below, is that SF treated 
trolling as a game (albeit sometimes a very hotly contested one). In RE, 
trolling was predominantly treated as aberrant and undesirable behaviour 
that required quick suppression. However, attempts to manage trolling 
sometimes caused more irritation than the trolling itself, since those efforts 
prolonged and drew attention to the unwelcome interaction: 
 
Example 7 
A Back to smells: ammonia doesn’t work. [Name] like that so much 
he tried to put his nose in the baggie and snort up all the ammonia 
soaked cotton balls. 
B Yep, take a plastic bag, fill it with ammonia soaked cotton balls, 
and put it over your horse’s muzzle....... Real f**king smart...... 
A Smarter than you, who appears to be really fucking DUMB. 
C PLEASE DON’T FEED THE TROLL!!!!! damnit. 
B It’s my thread, I get to feed whomever I want in it. BTW, do 
you think posting "PLEASE DON’T FEED THE TROLL!!!!" 
a zillion times ISN’T feeding the troll? Silly you. 
F Fine. Whatever. Not feeding trolls is usually a choice of wisdom. 
Clearly some of you prefer to be taken in. 
(RE060717) 
 In Example 7, C’s efforts to prevent B from continuing to engage with A 
only aggravate B, despite the fact that B seems to accept the probability 
that A is trolling. 
A notable feature of the ignore strategy was that in most examples, 
users choose to speak to one another, instead of addressing the (alleged) 
troller directly. However, indirect conversations between members which 
aim to exclude and stifle the troller, can still provide an opening to respond 
to, thereby actually exacerbating the problem. As B points out above, even 
an overt ‘non-response’ (e.g., where members openly declare their 
intentions to ignore the troller) is still a response, and automatically self-





Group members did not always have the choice of simply killfiling users 
that they wished to ignore, since sometimes, as noted by Donath’s (1999: 
45) work, and later extended by Utz (2005: 50), one strategy of (alleged) 
trollers is to knowingly present authentic-sounding but poor or dangerous 
advice. In the case of this dataset, and particularly RE, this also extended to 
giving out poor-quality information and setting dangerous examples. As a 
result, more knowledgeable members with social and moral concerns for 
other less-knowledgeable group members are effectively driven to 
contradict this advice. Some users further felt obliged to take note of those 




A Hi B – pretty – and they grow so fast.... My eye caught up on a 
detail of Mom’s forefoot: I compared it with Mystic’s forefoot in a 
shot on a trailing lead I took earlier this evening: [link to 
photograph of a young horse grazing loose (i.e. not held by 
anyone), its reins thrown over a rock and its leadrope trailing on 
the ground around its forefoot] ...and I noticed a difference in 
angle – just a passing step probably? 
C There are so many scary things in your picture, A. I’m not going 
to rise to the troll’s bait. In re your observation about angles: 
Joints look different depending on whether they are standing still 
or moving. That’s how joints work. Duh. 
A Sorry if I frightened you, but I’m glad you spoke up. I already 
read what happens when someone here tries to do the kind of 
simple thing I do without a problem, I need a cautionary note 
every time. 
D That’s because there’s a huge difference between safe practices, 
and unsafe practices where you have been lucky, so far. […] 
Given your propensity for doing unsafe things, some day your 
luck will run out too. 
C Some of the time you will get away with leaving a young horse 
tacked up and grazing with a rope on the ground. But just like 
when you pass on the blind corner, when you don’t get away with 
it, the result is so messy, and often so tragic, that people with 
functioning brain cells find that taking reasonable precautions ( 
AKA good horsemanship or good driving) is smart. FAilure to 
take these precautions is the origin of most Darwin Awards. 
Sheesh. 
A Hi C. No offence intended. But may I ask, are you a rated riding 
instructor, or possibly a show judge? I have found it’s very 
important to check my sources when reading this NG. And I 
accept some risks because I am handling several green horses 
every day – nearly always quite alone. The picture that got you 
excited was a snap I took after ground walking two young 
geldings in tack yesterday. I dropped both their lines while I took a 
picture. I walked another two today. And I dropped their lines for 
a few moments too. And probably will continue to do so every 
day. Sorry. 
B No, I’m not a "rated" riding instructor, whatever that is. I do, 
however, know better than to leave a fully tacked up young 





A Rendered animal fat – such as neatsfoot oil for leather tack – is 
probably as close as animal fats should get to horses I think – if 
that. I add a splash of Canola to feed, along with sunflower seed. 
E And I doubt I will *ever* follow any of your advice, troll. 
(RE090125) 
 
In this instance, A in both examples is the same individual, and despite the 
fact that the advice they offer in 
Example  is not momentous or particularly risky, E is quick to discount it 
based on A’s behaviour such as that in Example 8 from two years 
previously. As a result, though E may feel morally unable to killfile A due 
to his habit of giving out bad advice that needs to be contradicted, she can 
still informally moderate his interaction in other ways, by drawing attention 
to his status as an untrustworthy outcast. 
These two examples also raise an important issue about assigning 
roles to users. The ‘defensive’ counter-strategy arguably most closely fits 
with C, D and E’s responses, yet still falls far from the mark. In both 
examples, C, D and E are not really protecting their own faces – rather, 
they are trying to protect other, innocent users from potential harm, and in 
so doing, they are arguably using ‘offensive’ strategies that damage A’s 
face. Further, if we accept that A is trolling, then he is using a covert 
offensive attack to trigger an overt (offensive or defensive) counter-attack 
which will then look like the prime aggressing action, rather than a 
(justified) reaction. In so doing, he attacks whilst assuming the position of 
the victim, and the targets (the group) are positioned as the attackers if they 
attempt to defend themselves. In short, even to categorise a post as an 
attack or counter-attack, we must first establish each participant’s role, 
since the proactive and wrongful aggressor may have assumed the identity 
of the reactive and wronged victim, whilst seeking to place the actual 





Within the data, it was clear that not just any response was a success for 
trollers. Some users adopted responses that were offensive in character 
(Culpeper et al., 2003: 1562–5; and Harris et al., 1986), but that aimed to 
avoid the appearance of having been trolled, whilst also allowing 
themselves the opportunity of responding to (perceived) trolling. This 
occasionally occurred indirectly, where users would talk amongst 
themselves, usually about how trollers ought to be dealt with: 
 
Example 10 
B Haven’t we used up all the troll food yet? 





D Personally, I’m thinking the most appropriate treatment would 
be a 150 grain copper/lead bolus administered intracranially, 
but unfortunately, that’s considered an "off-label" use for trolls, 
and there’s so much paperwork involved in getting approval that it 
isn’t worth the effort. 
 (RE060622) 
 
The benefit of an indirect response is that, should a troller respond, the user 
can deny that his post was about her, but indirect challenges also carry the 
risk that the troller may not realise, or may choose to pretend not to realise, 
that these posts target her. Indeed, given the nature of this type of response, 
it may be considered as a hybrid of both exposing (see previous section) 
and challenging. 
Challenging also occurred directly, where the user would openly 
confront the troller: 
 Example 12 
A I am a civilized person. If you defeat me that is fine. 
B Fine or not, you went down in flames when you entered this 
newsgroup. Even the dullards on this bunch eat trolls breakfast 
and use their bones for toothpicks. 
(RE051108) 
 
Such attempts, however, whilst they may seek to scare a troller off, can 
easily be interpreted as flaming, and the user may then find his response 
being reconstructed by the troller and/or other members as taking the bait 
and being trolled – in short, as sincere engagement, particularly if the 
troller is amused enough by his response to keep the interaction going. As a 
result, this is a strategy with a higher risk–reward balance. Should the user 
successfully drive the troller out of the group, he has the satisfaction of 
proactively enforcing his group norms (rather than simply ignoring the 
troller in the hope that she will get bored and leave) but if his responses 
only entertain the troller and cause greater disruption, he may find himself 
exposed to the ignominy of being censured by other members and being 





One of the most interesting aspects that emerged was how trollers are 
appraised for their trolling quality, especially in terms of how others 
responded. The efforts of (alleged) trollers were open to critiques of their 
cleverness, effectiveness and success, and users from both RE and SF were 
quick to criticise ‘poor’ attempts: 
 
Example 13 
A I am boarding my pony at a stable and the dumb bitch that runs the 
place is having a fit because I am 3 months late in my board 
money. I told her I planned to pay in full as soon as I win the 
lottery this month, and I know I will be winning because it’s my 
turn to win. Instead of being happy that I plan to get paid up, she 
mailed me a letter that said "You must pay all your back board in 
full by May 15, 2006, or you will be dealing with the po lice". 
(Exactly in those words). I know that po lice means pony lice. The 
bitch is going to intentionally infect my pony. That is not fair to 
the pony. I think I am going to have to sue this bitch. By the way, 
If anyone plans to board their horse in the [Location] area, DO 
NOT board at [Business Name]. The owner is a fucking bitch, and 
she beats and starves all the boarders horses. 
B Well aren’t you a friendly girl. You might have to keep 
practising your trolling though. It’s not very good. 








E Bad troll, back in your box! I would be ashamed of crappy 
troll material like that... 
(SF070420) 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, A’s efforts are roundly criticised, and, intriguingly, 
C, D and E suggest that trollers should actually try harder and come up 
with better material. This strategy is notable for two reasons. It (implicitly 
or explicitly) positions the users as having already identified the accused as 
a troller, and it also constructs the troller as poor, inept or unintelligent. By 
comparison, the users present themselves as knowledgeable, experienced 
with trolling, and in a position to advise and appraise the efforts of would-
be trollers. 




B Why is anyone responding to this troll? In the history of the trolls 
we have had here, he is not entertaining. 
C Yes, but he’s a new troll. And he’s really dumb, no matter what he 
says. Don’t tell me you’ve never watched a cat tossing around 




A You know not who you are dealing with... 
D Indeed I do- an exceptionally inept and entertaining troll. 
(RE060112) 
 
The efficacy of this strategy may be found in the fact that by turning 
trolling into a show or game, the users become an audience that has 
consciously chosen, and is allowing itself, to be amused. Meanwhile, the 
(alleged) troller loses the advantage of any supposed deception through 
which they might aggravate the group, and is instead turned into a 
caricature that is being judged for her ability to put on an amusing show. 
However, adept, clever and successful trollers were also often directly (see 
Examples 18 and 19) and indirectly (see Examples 20, 21 and 22) appraised 
and critiqued by users. Interestingly, praise for ‘good’ trolling was 
markedly less common in SF: 
 Example 18 
A Ah...now it makes sense. You *are* a troll! I suspected as much. I 
give it to ya, you were a bit (only a bit) more clever than most 




B Ok, I get it. Nice subtle troll. Fair play to you, you had me going 




C It was a successful troll. I don’t know why people do it. It must 





D One thing I can say for E is that he’s the most successful troll 





F I think we are dealing with an exceptionally talented troll! She 
even has us talking about her in another thread. Without feeding 
the troll, we are feeding the troll. 
(RE060317) 
 
This suggests that even though trolling is meant as an aggravation to users, 
it can become a two-sided game where a troller seeks to deceive and attack, 
and users parry with critiques on quality and cleverness. In so doing, users 
are addressing the (alleged) troller’s real intent (i.e., to troll), rather than her 
pseudo-intent (i.e., to sincerely engage the group). Where this occurs, users 
appear to adopt something close to mock impoliteness. However, whilst 
mock impoliteness aims to enhance social cohesion and affect (and may, 
indeed, do so between the group members in question), in these cases, the 
troller is still ostracised and excluded (Haugh, 2008, 2010; Labov, 1972; 





Users would occasionally offensively counter-attack a trolling attempt by 
mocking or parodying the troller. This occurred both indirectly in 
discussions about trollers, and was sometimes aimed directly at the troller. 
Whilst it occurred occasionally in RE, it was most popular in SF: 
 
Example 23 
A Take your little net-kiddie wars to another dimension in time. If 
you are men, I feel embarrassed for all who reply -- because you 
act like women. 
B I refuse to respond to this obvious troll. 
C Errrr...didnt you just reply? 




E geez, it’s tough to be a troll on this group....<g> 
F how come [Name], [Name], [Name], [Name], etal, haven’t joined 
in? <snort> 
G Too much pride to waste their talent on a whack job? ;-) 
H Aw, the pickin’s have been sorta thin in the troll department 
lately...you keep your hand in on what’s available, ya know? ;>) 
J My horse is laying on the ground barely breathing. Until I can 
get medical/surgical on him and can then call the vet (not 
before next week), can you tell me: 1. what’s wrong with him? 




B, a long-established user with a reputation for humour, uses a reply to a 
troller’s efforts as an opportunity to not only potentially troll the troller but 
also to mock the troll, as a method of enhancing her solidarity with her own 
group. Similarly, J draws on in-group knowledge and norms to parody the 
types of trolling that are recognisable, and therefore are amusing to, her 
group (de Fina, 2006: 352). 
Indirectly mocking a troller incorporates its own element of face-
protection since the users could deny the relationship between their humour 
and the troller. This strategy also serves the function of strengthening group 
cohesion by identifying those in-group members who can understand and 
enjoy the humour appropriately from those who are excluded or out-
grouped – either by a lack of knowledge or because the humour targets 
them. 
Cultural differences between RE/SF may also be one reason why 
this strategy occurs more frequently in SF. Specifically, SF is characterised 
by a more jocular, relaxed and satirical nature, unlike RE which tends more 
towards serious discussion and is less tolerant of behaviour that falls 
outside the group’s norms of interaction. As a result, SF users more 
frequently challenged the troller directly by using mockery or sarcasm: 
 
Example 25 
B Heh. I’m starting to like you, A, I really am. It’s precisely your 
self-righteous attitude which is going to save the world from 
everything. You’re my second-favourite troll of 2009. Although I 
do actually suspect you of being C. 
(SF090123) 
 
In this case, B works to neutralise the threat that the alleged troller, A, 
poses by reframing her and her efforts from being a potential danger to the 
group’s harmony and cohesion, to an entertainment that can be enjoyed, 
particularly by B, but also by the rest of the group. By further classifying A 
as only his ‘second’ favourite troll (and only ‘of 2009’), this adds the extra 
insult of suggesting that A is not even the best at this, either. In some 
instances, this tactic was taken into the realms of ‘educating’ the troller, 
and therefore had a great deal of overlap with the strategy of critiquing 
trolling (see previous section). In others, SF users employed multiple 
strategies, such as mocking the troller directly whilst also taking up the 
running joke between themselves. In so doing, rather than (explicitly) 
suppressing or preventing the (alleged) troller from responding, the users 
even encouraged further replies that allowed them to continue their 
mockery. The intriguing result of this was that, as threads progressed, some 
trollers increasingly failed to reply, perhaps as a result of discovering that 
they had gradually been positioned as the one being trolled. As a result, 
these types of response at times overlapped with, and in some cases 





A final major response type found in these datasets involved users 
endeavouring to jeopardise the troller’s success by trolling them in return: 
 
Example 26 
C Umm... B? Do you think A made up her hot_ail address all special 
for us, just for this post? (Google is your friend.) Do you think she 
really has a husband? Do you think she is really even a _she_? 
Wait. I get it!!! You’re trolling the troll. Had me going for a 




A There’s a delete key? 
F Assuming you haven’t deleted it, then yes, yes there is. It’s right 
next to the ‘ignore’ key. 
E Good ol’ F. Always trolling teh trolls. I do hope life is treating 
you well. 
F Oh it is. 
G You know, he’s just got a big shiny new van with the words 
‘Good ol’ F - Always trolling teh trolls’ printed in big red letters 
on the side. And his number so you can call him any time day or 
night when you want some trolls trolled. I think the business will 
do really well. It’s also got a "How’s my driving?" sticker on the 
back but cleverly the phone number goes to his own house rather 
than the mysterious driving police.  
(SF060330) 
 
Examples 26 and 27 demonstrate the ability of users such as C and F to 
entirely switch roles from target to attacker, by taking on a trolling identity 
and attempting to aggravate the (alleged) troller. As noted above, this 
strategy can be born out of users challenging, critiquing and mocking 
(alleged) would-be trollers. In some instances, this appeared to be 
successful in that the troller ceased to take part in the group’s discussions. 
However, in other cases, the high level of risk inherent in this retaliation-in-
kind strategy became extremely apparent. In some cases, it merely 
triggered extensive, heated conflict spirals that spanned many days, 
hundreds of posts and dozens of users (Andersson and Pearson, 1999; 
Felson, 1982: 245; and Lein and Brenneis, 1978: 301). In two notable 
instances, however, which have not been reproduced to protect all involved, 
this escalated beyond trolling, into far more serious behaviour that is better 
captured as cyberstalking. In these cases, the (alleged) trollers deliberately 
found contact information about the users who had attacked them, 
including names, addresses and contact details of their workplaces and 
family members (including children). This information was then published 
in posts (an action that is informally known as doxxing) with threats or 
claims that the (alleged) troller had sent out e-mails to the various contacts 
linking them back to the argument and threatening the target with the loss 
of their employment if they continued it. In short, whilst this response type 
was, for some users, an amusing and inconsequential strategy, for a 
minority of (alleged) trollers, it was sufficiently aggravating to provoke 
them into at least threatening, if not actually trying, to cause off-line harm 
or damage to the user. 
It is, of course, impossible to know whether those efforts met with 
any kind of success – one can only hope not – but this returns us to the 
serious consideration that whilst many manifestations of trolling may fall 
into the category of merely annoying another, this behaviour can also 
escalate, and sometimes extremely quickly, through a broad grey area of 
behaviour that is border-line illegal (with reference to UK legislation), 
through to behaviour that is menacing, grossly offensive, and seeks to do 




1. Conclusion: over the bridge 
 
In this paper, I analysed the common responses to (alleged) trolling 
identified in RE and SF as trolling behaviour, and essentially classified 
these in to seven types: 
 
(1)  Engaging by responding sincerely; 
(2) Ignoring the trolling attempt overtly or covertly; 
(3)  Exposing the troller to the rest of the group; 
(4)  Challenging the troller directly or indirectly; 
(5) Critiquing the effectiveness, success, or ‘quality’ of the troller; 
(6) Mocking or parodying the trolling attempt; and, 
(7) Reciprocating in kind by trolling the troller. 
 
When we return to the response framework suggested by Harris et al. 
(1986) and later developed by Culpeper et al. (2003: 1562–5), most 
response types could not be accounted for well. In reality, it quickly 
became clear that, rather than opting for one response or another, users 
were frequently mixing strategies (e.g., acceptance and defensive, 
defensive and offensive, or even acceptance, defensive and offensive). It is 
only fair to note, however, that this same remark can be made about the 
seven response types given above. Some users reciprocated using mockery, 
whilst others challenged through critiques, and so forth. That said, these 
response types do enable us to cast light on the increasing level of face-
threatening retaliation that attacked users and (alleged) trollers employed. 
We can, therefore, emulate that model to an extent, and summarise the 
outcomes of (perceived) trolling attempts. Trolling can be:
 
(1) Successful: users do not perceive an intent to troll and are 
provoked into responding as the troller desires (i.e., they engage), 
risking a high degree of face damage; 
(2) Frustrated: users interpret an intent to troll and do not respond 
(i.e., they ignore), risking little or no face damage; 
(3) Thwarted: users interpret an intent to troll and counter in a way 
that reduces the troller’s success, or even causes them to lose face 
(i.e., they expose, challenge, critique, mock or reciprocate), 
risking anywhere from none to maximum face damage and 
possibly further offline consequences; or, 
(4) Failed: users both do not perceive an intent to troll and are not 
provoked. This is included for the sake of completeness, but there 
is no evidence of this in the data. 
 
There are issues to bear in mind, however. Previous papers (Hardaker, 
2010, 2013) have discussed (i) that this research is primarily based on 
examples that Hs claim to perceive as trolling, without being able to 
account for issues such as mistakes and deception; (ii) the value of 
quantitatively processing these strategies when faced with combinations of 
multiple response types; and (iii) the (ever-increasing) semantic scope of 
‘trolling’ as a term, which is as contextually bound and as relative as a term 
such as ‘impoliteness’ (Hetcher, 2004; and Opp, 1982; 2001). 
A fourth issue that comes to the fore here, is that whilst this paper 
has covered some response types, Usenet is only one form of CMC, and 
only two groups have been selected which are, in turn, quite different. RE 
and SF alone cannot represent all of Usenet – indeed, Usenet newsgroups, 
even those on the same topic, can contrast markedly in their norms and 
limits, so we simply cannot assume that all interaction within even one type 
of CMC will be homogenous, let alone the whole of the Internet. As such, 
these strategies and responses should only be viewed as an indicative first 
step towards understanding trolling, and not as an exhaustive list. CMC, by 
its very nature, is enormous, complex, varied and quickly evolving. Thus, it 
is more likely than not that analysis of further data will reveal more 
response types than are presented here, and, indeed, an exhaustive list of 
response types even with infinitely more data is probably as unattainable as 
an exhaustive list of any given pragmatic strategy. This does not render 
these results valueless, however. They provide some insight, however 
tentative, into long-form, unmoderated, group-based interactions. Further, 
they stand as useful hypotheses against which to test and explore new data, 
and can then be extended or discarded on the basis of newer findings. 
Moreover, this work is an addition, however small, to an extremely under-
researched field. 
In practical terms, this work also allows for further exploration of 
the ways in which corpus methods may facilitate pragmatic analyses, 
despite the apparent mismatch between the two. With regard to forensic 
linguistics, and particularly forensic pragmatics, this work also draws 
attention to a range of issues, from determining intent based on what may 
be deceptive interactions, to deciding upon an instigator when individuals 
may have manipulated others into overtly attacking first, and to advising 
individuals of the risks associated with responding in certain ways. 
In conclusion, trolling is a far more complex matter than merely 
launching unprovoked attacks on others; it is open to criticisms of its 
quality, effectiveness and success, and it can be turned around on the troller 
so that she is reconstructed as the naive, gullible victim instead of the 
successful aggressor. Some response types are exactly what a troller would 
seek and, therefore, only encourage the situation further, whilst others 
(arguably closer to strategies) appear to be more successful at effectively 
ending trolling with lesser degrees of risk, whilst others seem to run a 
small, but serious risk of provoking extreme reactions from trollers who 
then seek to cause off-line damage. 
One thing is clear from this work: far more research is yet needed 
into linguistic manipulation and deception, and in behaviours such as 
trolling, cyberbullying, e-hoaxing, and so forth. This paper seeks to take a 





Andersson, L. and C. Pearson. 1999. ‘Tit for tat? The spiraling effect of 
incivility in the workplace’, Academy of Management Review 24 
(3), pp. 452–71. 
Arundale, R.B. 2008. ‘Against (Gricean) intentions at the heart of human 
interaction’, Intercultural Pragmatics 5 (2), pp. 229–58. 
Baker, P. 2001. ‘Moral panic and alternative identity construction in 
Usenet’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7 (1). 
Available online at: http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol7/issue1/baker.html 
BBC. 2010. ‘Jade Goody website “troll” from Manchester jailed.’ BBC 
News, 29 October 2010. Accessed 12 November 2010 at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-11650593 
Bernstein, M.S., A. Monroy-Hernández, D. Harry, P. André, K. Panovich 
and G. Vargas. 2011. ‘4chan and /b/: An Analysis of Anonymity and 
Ephemerality in a Large Online Community’, Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 1–8. 
Binns, A. 2011. ‘Don’t feed the trolls: managing troublemakers in 
magazines’ online communities.’ Mapping the Magazine  3 (Cardiff 
University), pp. 
Camber, R. and S. Neville. 2011. ‘Sick internet ‘troll’ who posted vile 
messages and videos taunting the death of teenagers is jailed for 18 
WEEKS.’ Daily Mail, 14 September 2011. Accessed 2 December 
2011 at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2036935/Natasha-
MacBryde-death-Facebook-internet-troll-Sean-Duffy-jailed.html 
Carney, T. 2014. ‘Being (im)polite: a forensic linguistic approach to 
interpreting a hate speech case’, Language Matters 45 (3), pp. 325–
41. 
Chakraborti, N. 2010. Hate Crime: Concepts, Policy, Future Directions. 
London: Willan. 
Culpeper, J., D. Bousfield and A. Wichmann. 2003. ‘Impoliteness revisited: 
with special reference to dynamic and prosodic aspects’, Journal of 
Pragmatics 35 (10–11), pp. 1545–79. 
Culpeper, J. and C. Hardaker. Forthcoming. ‘Pragmatics and corpus 
linguistics’ in P. Baker and J. Egbert (eds) Triangulating 
Methodological Approaches in Corpus Linguistic Research. London: 
Routledge. 
Donath, J.S. 1999. ‘Identity and deception in the virtual community’ in 
M.A. Smith and P. Kollock (eds) Communities in Cyberspace, pp. 
29–59. London: Routledge. 
Douglas, K.M. and C. McGarty. 2001. ‘Identifiability and self-presentation: 
computer-mediated communication and intergroup interaction’, 
British Journal of Social Psychology 40 (3), pp. 399–416. 
Doyle, J. 1989. ‘Re: <hick!>.’ alt.callahans  14th December, pp. 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/alt.callahans/SphfCkUsdtY/FggkP4
rvoQEJ. 
Facebook. 2010. ‘Statement of rights and responsibilities’. Accessed 13 
May 2010 at: http://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
Felson, R.B. 1982. ‘Impression management and the escalation of 
aggression and violence’, Social Psychology Quarterly 45 (4), pp. 
245–54. 
de Fina, A. 2006. ‘Group identity, narrative, and self-representations’ in A. 
de Fina, D. Schiffrin and M. Bamberg (eds) Discourse and Identity, 
pp. XX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fraser, B. 1998. ‘Threatening revisited’, Forensic Linguistics 5 (2), pp. 
159–73. 
Gibbs, R.W. 2001. ‘Intentions as emergent products of social interactions’ 
in B. Malle, L. Moses and D. Baldwin (eds) Intentions and 
Intentionality, pp. 105–122. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Golder, S.A. and J.S. Donath. 2004. ‘Social roles in electronic 
communities’ in Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) 
Conference: Internet Research 5.0, pp. 1–25. 19–22 September. 
Brighton, England. 
Grimshaw, A.D. (ed.). 1990. Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations 
of Arguments in Conversations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hardaker, C. 2010. ‘Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated 
communication: from user discussions to academic definitions’, 
Journal of Politeness Research: Language, Behaviour, Culture 6 (2), 
pp. 215–42. doi: 10.1515/jplr.2010.011. 
Hardaker, C. 2013. ‘“Uh.....not to be nitpicky,,,,,but...the past tense of drag 
is dragged, not drug”: an overview of trolling strategies’, Journal of 
Language Aggression and Conflict 1 (1), pp. 57–85. 
Harris, L., K. Gergen and J. Lannaman. 1986. ‘Aggression rituals’, 
Communication Monographs 53 (Sept.), pp. 252–65. 
Haugh, M. 2008. ‘Intention in pragmatics’, Intercultural Pragmatics 5 (2), 
pp. 99–110. 
Haugh, M. 2010. ‘Jocular mockery, (dis)affiliation and face’, Journal of 
Pragmatics 42 (8), pp. 2106–19. 
Herring, S.C. 2003. ‘Computer-mediated discourse’ in D. Schiffrin, D. 
Tannen and H.E. Hamilton (eds) The Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis, pp. . Oxford: Blackwell. 
Herring, S.C., K. Job-Sluder, R. Scheckler and S. Barab. 2002. ‘Searching 
for Safety Online: Managing ‘Trolling’ in a Feminist Forum’, The 
Information Society 18, pp. 371–84. 
Hetcher, S.A. 2004. Norms in a Wired World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jucker, A.H. 2013. ‘Corpus pragmatics’ in J.-O. Östman and J. 
Verschueren (eds) Handbook of Pragmatics, pp. 1–17. Amsterdam: 
Benjamins. 
Jucker, A.H., D. Schreier and M. Hundt (eds). 2009. ‘Corpora: pragmatics 
and discourse’, Papers from the 29th International Conference on 
English Language Research on Computerized Corpora (ICAME 29). 
(Language and Computers: Studies in Practical Linguistics 68). 
Ascona, Switzerland, 14–18. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
Labov, W. 1972. Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English 
Vernacular. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lampe, C. and P. Resnick. 2004. ‘Slash(dot) and burn: distributed 
moderation in a large online conversation space’ in proceedings of 
the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems: 
Changing our world, changing ourselves  pp. 543–50. New York, 
USA: ACM. 
Leech, G.N. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. 
Lein, L. and D. Brenneis. 1978. ‘Children’s disputes in three speech 
communities’, Language in Society 7 (3), pp. 299–323. 




Mauney, J. 1982. ‘second verse, same as the first.’ net.nlang  5 July, pp. 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/net.nlang/YNX8PlANL_g/Uveya3f
B1ZkJ. 
McLaughlin, M.L., K.K. Osborne and C.B. Smith. 1995. ‘Standards of 
conduct on Usenet’ in S. Jones (ed.) CyberSociety: Computer-
mediated Communication and Community, pp. 90–111. Thousand 
Oaks, California; London: Sage Publications. 
Miller, M. 1990. ‘FOADTAD.’ alt.flame  8 February, pp. 
https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!msg/alt.flame/RMl
Mz6ft4r8/SwPcwihXE4AJ. 
Mills, S. 2003. Gender and Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mooney, A. 2004. ‘Co-operation, violations and making sense’, Journal of 
Pragmatics 36 (5), pp. 1601–23. 
Morris, S. 2011. ‘Internet troll jailed after mocking deaths of teenagers.’ 
Guardian 13 September 2011. Accessed 15 September 2011 at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/13/internet-troll-jailed-
mocking-teenagers 
O’Keefe, B.J. 1989. ‘Communication theory and practical knowledge’ in B. 
Dervin (ed.) Rethinking Communication, pp. 197–215. Newbury 
Park: Sage. 
Opp, K.-D. 1982. ‘The evolutionary emergence of norms’, British Journal 
of Social Psychology 21, pp. 139–49. 
Opp, K.-D. 2001. ‘How do social norms emerge? An outline of a theory’, 
Mind and Society 2 (1), pp. 101–28. 
Plato. 2007. The Republic. (Third edition.) London: Penguin Classic. 
Romero-Trillo, J. (ed.). 2008. Pragmatics and Corpus Linguistics. Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Scott, M. 2009. WordSmith Tools. Liverpool: Lexical Analysis Software. 
Shachaf, P. and N. Hara. 2010. ‘Beyond vandalism: Wikipedia trolls.’ 
Journal of Information Science 36 (3), pp. 357–70. 
Shin, J. 2008. ‘Morality and internet behavior: a study of the Internet troll 
and its relation with morality on the Internet’ in K. McFerrin, R. 
Weber, R. Carlsen and D. A. Willis (eds) proceedings of Society for 
Information Technology and Teacher Education International 
Conference 2008, pp. 2834–40. Chesapeake, VA: AACE. 
Sia, C.-L., B.C.Y. Tan and K.-K. Wei. 2002. ‘Group polarization and 
computer-mediated communication: effects of communication cues, 
social presence, and anonymity’, Information Systems Research 13 
(1), pp. 70–90. 
Siegel, J., V.J. Dubrovsky, S. Kiesler and T.W. McGuire. 1986. ‘Group 
processes in computer-mediated communication’, Organizational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes 37 (2), pp. 157–87. 
Taavitsainen, I., A.H. Jucker and J. Tuominen (eds). 2014. Diachronic 
Corpus Pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Tepper, M. 1997. ‘Usenet communities and the cultural politics of 
information’ in D. Porter (ed.) Internet Culture, pp. 39–54. New 
York: Routledge. 
Utz, S. 2005. ‘Types of deception and underlying motivation: what people 
think’, Social Science Computer Review 23 (1), pp. 49–56. 
Vinagre, M. 2008. ‘Politeness strategies in collaborative e-mail exchanges’, 
Computers and Education 50 (3), pp. 1022–36. 
Watts, R.J. 2003. Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
Table 1: Comparative information concerning RE and SF 
 
Token RE SF 
Group creation date 2 Dec. 87 4 June 98 
Corpus collection date 31/05/11 31/05/11 
Group subscriber-count 
at corpus collection date 1,106 211 
Group post-count at 
corpus collection date 
795,349  
(avg 92.767 per day) 
288,163  
(avg 60.472 per day) 
Corpus date-range 1 July 05  to  30 June 10 10 Mar. 05  to  30 June 10 
Corpus post-count 170,634 57,734 








 Wordcount is a very weak guide, since Usenet posts frequently (re)quote, and discounting 
(re)quoted material to acquire a real wordcount, whether automatically or manually, is very 
cost–benefit prohibitive. 
